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Abstract
We investigate the security against the intercept/resend attack and the delayed
measurement attack on the quantum key distribution protocol based on the pre-
and post-selection effect. In 2001, Bub proposed the quantum cryptography scheme,
which was an application of the so-called mean king’s problem. We evaluate the
probability that legitimate users cannot detect the eavesdropper’s malicious acts for
Bub’s protocol. We also estimate the probability that the eavesdropper guesses right
at the random secret key one of the legitimate users tries to share with the other
one. On the one hand, we conclude that this protocol is weaker than the Bennett-
Brassard protocol of 1984 (BB84) under the intercept/resend attack. On the other
hand, we prove the eavesdropper’s impossibility of the delayed measurement attack
on this protocol. We stress the importance of the fact that the delayed measurement
attack covers the collective attack and the coherent attack. Thus, the impossibility
of the delayed measurement attack is a strong result. Because of this impossibility,
Bub’s protocol is unique among other quantum key distribution schemes.
1 Introduction
The quantum key distribution is one of the practical goals that researchers in the field of
quantum information attempt to achieve from both theoretical and experimental points
of view. Since the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984 (BB84) and the Ekert protocol of
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Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-0013, Japan. Email: hiroo.azuma@m3.dion.ne.jp
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1991 (E91) were proposed, the security of the quantum key distribution protocols has
been studied eagerly [1, 2, 3].
The quantum key distribution is aimed at establishing a secure random secret key
between two parties, Alice and Bob. For example, Alice and Bob can use this key for the
one-time pad cipher. To examine the security of the quantum key distribution, we assume
that the eavesdropper Eve can interact with the quantum channel through which Alice and
Bob send and receive signals. For evaluating the security of the quantum cryptography
in concrete terms, we study some typical strategies Eve pursues.
One of the simplest strategies that Eve follows is the intercept/resend attack [4]. In
this attack, Eve makes a strong projective measurement on the signal emitted by Alice
in an arbitrary basis and sends a new one to Bob, depending on the result Eve obtains.
If we construct qubits from single photons, Eve can perform the intercept/resend attack
only with passive linear optics, that is to say, beamsplitters, waveplates, photodetectors,
and a single photon source. Eve does not need to prepare two-qubit gates that generate
entanglement for the intercept/resend attack.
Another basic strategy that we have to consider is the delayed measurement attack
[5, 6]. In this strategy, Eve produces entanglement between the qubits the legitimate user
sends and her auxiliary quantum system, and waits until she obtains the public discussion
between Alice and Bob to make a measurement on her auxiliary system. To mount this
attack on qubits Alice and Bob transmit, Eve has to make use of quantum circuits, in
other words, a quantum computer, to generate entanglement between the signals and
her own auxiliary system. Thus, the delayed measurement attack is more difficult and
sophisticated than the intercept/resend attack.
In 2001, Bub proposed a unique protocol for the quantum key distribution [7]. It is
based on the pre- and post-selection effect, which Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz
discovered [8, 9]. In Reference [8], they discussed the measurement of a quantum system
at time t between two other measurements performed at times t1 and t2, where t1 < t < t2,
in the following situation.
We assume that the measurement at the time t1 lets the quantum system be in the
state |ψ1(t1)〉. This state has the standard time evolution, |ψ1(t)〉 = U(t1, t)|ψ1(t1)〉. Si-
multaneously, we assume that the measurement at the time t2 generates the state |ψ2(t2)〉
for the quantum system. Its backward time evolution is given by 〈ψ2(t)| = 〈ψ2(t2)|U(t, t2).
Then, the measurement at the time t of a variable C is obtained as
prob(C = cn) =
|〈ψ2(t)|Pˆ (C = cn)|ψ1(t)〉|2∑
j |〈ψ2(t)|Pˆ (C = cj)|ψ1(t)〉|2
, (1)
where Pˆ (C = cj) is a projection operator made of an eigenvector with an eigenvalue cj.
We put the hat on the symbols of the projection operators hereafter to draw your attention
on them. Equation (1) is called the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule (ABL-rule). The
ABL-rule is regarded as a new concept that gives a complete description of a quantum
system in the time interval between two measurements, that is to say, information about
the system both from the past and from the future [10].
In Reference [11], according to the ABL-rule, Vaidman, Aharonov, and Albert found
a process, in which the results of measurements of σx, σy, and σz are ascertained with a
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probability of unity. In their process, first, we prepare the maximally entangled initial
state of two spin-1/2 particles. Second, we perform the spin measurement of σx, σy, or σz
on a single qubit that belongs to the initial entangled state. Third, we take a measurement
on the composite system with an operator whose eigenvectors are entangled. Then, we
obtain results of measurements of σx, σy, and σz with a probability of unity although
these operators do not commute. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is regarded as one
of the pre- and post-selection effects.
The above process is known as a solution of the mean king’s problem [12]. Bub’s
quantum key distribution protocol is a natural application of the result obtained in Ref-
erence [11]. First, Alice prepares the initial two-qubit entangled state, and second, Bob
performs the measurement of σx or σz at random on the single qubit owned by the initial
two-qubit state. Third, Alice carries out the final measurement with the entangled basis.
Because the results of the measurements of σx and σz are ascertained with a probability
of unity, Alice can share a random secret key with Bob.
In the present paper, first, we examine the security against the intercept/resend attack
on Bub’s quantum key distribution protocol by evaluating the probability that Alice
and Bob cannot detect Eve’s illegal acts and the probability that Eve guesses right at
the random secret key Alice obtains. We show that these probabilities are given by
5/6 = 0.833... and (5 + 3
√
2)/10 = 0.924... respectively if Eve uses the Breidbart basis.
From these results, we can conclude that Bub’s protocol is more vulnerable than the BB84
under the intercept/resend attack.
Second, we prove that Eve cannot make the delayed measurement attack on Bub’s
protocol. For example, Cirac and Gisin showed that the delayed measurement attack is
more effective than the intercept/resend attack on the BB84 [13]. Thus, the impossibility
of the delayed measurement attack lets Bub’s protocol be unique among other quantum
key distribution schemes. This impossibility places restrictions on Eve’s collective attack
and coherent attack. More specifically, she cannot make the optimum measurement on
her probe (Eve’s auxiliary quantum system) according to the public discussion disclosed
by Alice and Bob through the classical channel. This point is examined in Section 5 of
the current paper.
So far, the security against each specified attack on Bub’s quantum key distribution
protocol has not been studied in a systematic manner. How about the security situation
of this scheme is as follows. It has not been proved to be secure under the collective
attack or the coherent attack. Even its security against the intercept/resend attack and
the delayed measurement attack has not been examined precisely yet. We have to say
that the study of security of Bub’s protocol is still at a very early stage of development.
In particular, unattainableness of the delayed measurement attack reduces the power of
Eve’s collective and coherent attacks as mentioned above. This is a very interesting and
unusual property of Bub’s scheme. These facts are the motivations for the current paper.
Here, we mention some preceding studies. Yoshida, Miyadera, and Imai derived trade-
off inequalities indicating that an increase of Eve’s information gain caused a rise of Alice
and Bob’s detection rate for Eve’s illegal acts during slightly modified Bub’s quantum
key distribution protocol [14]. In the protocol, they did not divide the sequence of the
transmissions into particular subsequences as Bub’s original protocol does, but chose
transmitted qubits at random for monitoring Eve’s malicious acts. Because of this modi-
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fication, Eve was able to take an attack scenario in which Eve observed her own entangled
subsystem after listening to Alice and Bob’s public discussion. Specifically, in the con-
siderations of Yoshida et al., the delayed measurement attack was effective and useful for
Eve.
In Reference [15], Yoshida et al. proposed simplified quantum key distribution pro-
tocols that were applications of the mean king’s problem. Werner, Franz, and Werner
also proposed another version of the quantum key distribution protocol based on the
mean king’s problem and examined its security against coherent attacks [16]. In Refer-
ence [16], Werner et al. proved the following, which is satisfied in general for the family
of the quantum key distribution protocols based on the mean king’s problem. If Eve does
not interfere in the perfect key agreement between Alice and Bob, she cannot learn any
information about the shared secret key.
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain Bub’s quantum
key distribution protocol step by step. In Section 3, we formulate the intercept/resend
attack on the protocol. In Section 4, we consider cases where specific relations hold for
the intercept/resend attack. We show that the Breidbart basis is optimum for Eve’s
attack. In Section 5, we prove the impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on
the protocol. In Section 6, we give a brief discussion.
2 The quantum key distribution protocol based on
the pre- and post-selection effect
In 2001, Bub proposed a quantum key distribution protocol based on the pre- and post-
selection effect [7]. This protocol is a natural application of the result obtained in Ref-
erence [11]. We explain the protocol step by step in this section. This section is a brief
review of References [7, 11].
The purpose of the scheme is for the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, to exchange a
random secret key. We assume that Alice and Bob can utilize both classical and quantum
channels. On the one hand, through the classical channel, they can transmit classical
signals to each other. The signals are disclosed publicly and the eavesdropper Eve can
learn the entire contents of the classical messages. On the other hand, via the quantum
channel, Alice and Bob can exchange quantum signals, namely qubits, with each other.
We assume that Eve can interact with the quantum channel, but she cannot do this
without disturbing the qubits in general.
First, Alice prepares the following maximally entangled initial state,
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉A| ↑〉C + | ↓〉A| ↓〉C), (2)
where the subscripts A and C represent the auxiliary and channel qubits, respectively.
The basis {| ↑〉, | ↓〉} denotes a pair of the eigenstates of σz. Alice keeps the auxiliary qubit
handy. The channel qubit is transmitted between Alice and Bob through the quantum
channel. Second, Alice sends the channel qubit to Bob. Third, receiving the channel qubit,
Bob observes either σx or σz at random on it. After the measurement, Bob returns the
channel qubit to Alice. Fourth, receiving the channel qubit, Alice measures an observable
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R on the pair of the auxiliary and channel qubits. The operator R has the following four
eigenstates:
|r1〉 = 1√
2
| ↑〉A| ↑〉C + 1
2
(eipi/4| ↑〉A| ↓〉C + e−ipi/4| ↓〉A| ↑〉C),
|r2〉 = 1√
2
| ↑〉A| ↑〉C − 1
2
(eipi/4| ↑〉A| ↓〉C + e−ipi/4| ↓〉A| ↑〉C),
|r3〉 = 1√
2
| ↓〉A| ↓〉C + 1
2
(e−ipi/4| ↑〉A| ↓〉C + eipi/4| ↓〉A| ↑〉C),
|r4〉 = 1√
2
| ↓〉A| ↓〉C − 1
2
(e−ipi/4| ↑〉A| ↓〉C + eipi/4| ↓〉A| ↑〉C). (3)
We pay attention to the facts that {|ri〉 : i = 1, 2, 3, 4} forms an orthonormal basis and∑4
i=1 |ri〉〈ri| = I.
Here, for example, we calculate the probability that Bob obtains an outcome ‘+1’ for
σx on condition that Alice detects |r1〉. We write projection operators of the eigenvalues
‘+1’ and ‘−1’ for σx as Pˆ (σx = 1) and Pˆ (σx = −1), respectively. We pay attention to the
fact that Pˆ (σx = ±1) act on the channel qubits. We obtain
〈r1|Pˆ (σx = 1)|ψ〉 = 1/2,
〈r1|Pˆ (σx = −1)|ψ〉 = 0, (4)
with ease. Thus, describing the probability that Bob’s outcome is ‘+1’ for the measure-
ment of σx on condition that Alice perceives |r1〉 as prob(σx = 1, r1), we achieve
prob(σx = 1, r1) =
|〈r1|Pˆ (σx = 1)|ψ〉|2∑
i∈{1,−1} |〈r1|Pˆ (σx = i)|ψ〉|2
= 1, (5)
according to the ABL-rule, that is to say Equation (1). Similarly, we arrive at
prob(σx = −1, r1) = |〈r1|Pˆ (σx = −1)|ψ〉|
2∑
i∈{1,−1} |〈r1|Pˆ (σx = i)|ψ〉|2
= 0, (6)
as well.
Equations (5) and (6) imply that Bob obtains the outcome ‘+1’ for the observation of
σx with a probability of unity if Alice detects |r1〉. Moreover, carrying out another similar
calculations, we obtain
prob(σz = 1, r1) = 1,
prob(σz = −1, r1) = 0, (7)
and we can show that Bob obtains the outcome ‘+1’ for the observation of σz with a
probability of unity if Alice finds |r1〉.
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Table 1: Relations of Alice’s detection for the observable R and Bob’s outcomes of mea-
surements for σx and σz. These relations are realized with a probability of unity.
σx σz
|r1〉 1 1
|r2〉 −1 1
|r3〉 1 −1
|r4〉 −1 −1
In the above discussion, we have reached an incredible result. Although the operators
σx and σz do not commute, both their outcomes of measurements are ascertained with a
probability of unity in the case where Alice perceives |r1〉. This phenomenon is regarded
as one of the pre- and post-selection effects. Alice’s detection of |r2〉, |r3〉, and |r4〉 also
leads to Bob’s determined outcomes of measurements for σx and σz. We summarize these
results in Table 1.
Here, we divide the sequence of communications between Alice and Bob into two
subsequences. The subsequence S14 consists of transmissions for which Alice detects |r1〉
or |r4〉. The subsequence S23 consists of transmissions for which she finds |r2〉 or |r3〉. On
the one hand, for S14, if Alice obtains |r1〉, Bob’s outcome has to be ‘+1’ for both σx and
σz. On the other hand, for S14, if Alice obtains |r4〉, Bob’s outcome has to be ‘−1’ for
both σx and σz. Contrastingly, on the one hand, for S23, if Alice detects |r2〉, Bob obtains
the outcome ‘−1’ for σx and the outcome ‘+1’ for σz. On the other hand, for S23, if Alice
perceives |r3〉, Bob obtains the outcome ‘+1’ for σx and the outcome ‘−1’ for σz .
Alice and Bob utilize the subsequence S23 for checking whether or not the channel
qubits are monitored by Eve. By contrast, they use the subsequence S14 to establish
a shared random secret key. First of all, Alice publicly announces the indices of the
subsequence S23 via the classical channel. At the same time, Alice discloses whether
she detects |r2〉 or |r3〉 in each transmission of S23. Because Alice uses the classical
channel for making the public announcements, Eve knows these pieces of information.
Receiving these advertisements, Bob examines whether or not his outcomes for σx and σz
are consistent with Alice’s announcements. If he finds even a single discrepancy between
his measurements and Alice’s advertisements, he concludes that Eve eavesdrops on their
transmissions. By contrast, if Bob cannot find any contradictions, he believes that there
is no illegal act executed by Eve. If Bob judges that the transmissions are not interfered
with by Eve, Alice obtains a series of ‘+1’ and ‘−1’ according to detections of |r1〉 and
|r4〉 and Bob obtains that by the outcomes of measurements of σx and σz.
If Alice and Bob follow the protocol correctly without Eve’s disturbance, the proba-
bilities that Alice obtains |ri〉 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the same and given by 1/4.
As explained in this section, Bub’s protocol requires the measurement of two-qubit
entangled states. This requirement is severe compared with the BB84 and the E91.
However, Bub’s scheme makes the delayed measurement attack noneffective as proved in
Section 5. This is a special merit and why we study Bub’s protocol.
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Alice
Eve
Bob
The measurement of
the two-qubit state
The initially
entangled qubits
The intercept/resend attack
The observation
of x or z
Eve's eavesdropping on the quantum key distribution protocol
Figure 1: The block diagram of Eve’s strategy for the intercept/resend attack.
3 The intercept/resend attack
We define the intercept/resend attack as follows. Eve measures the single qubit Alice
sends with an orthonormal basis {|ξ0〉, |ξ1〉}. After the measurement with the projection
operators, on the one hand, if Eve obtains |ξ0〉, she sends |ξ˜0〉 to Bob, where {|ξ˜0〉, |ξ˜1〉} is
another orthonormal basis. On the other hand, if Eve detects |ξ1〉, she sends |ξ˜1〉 to Bob.
However, in the present paper, we consider a simpler intercept/resend attack than the
above. We assume that Eve intercepts the single transmitted qubit with the orthonormal
basis {|ξ0〉, |ξ1〉} and resends an alternative qubit with the same basis {|ξ0〉, |ξ1〉} according
to the result of her measurement. This process is equal to the situation where Eve performs
the measurement on the single qubit Alice sends with the projection operators Pˆ (σξ = 1)
and Pˆ (σξ = −1).
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of Eve’s strategy. In the current paper, we assume
that Eve intercepts the qubit travelling from Alice to Bob. As mentioned in Section 2,
Bub’s protocol has a two-way quantum channel, in other words, a quantum channel from
Alice to Bob and that from Bob to Alice. Strictly speaking, for a two-way quantum key
distribution system, there are mainly two intercept/resend attack strategies. The first
one is taking arbitrarily attacks on each quantum channel, which we name the one-mode
attack. The second one is taking an entangled joint attack, specifically two interactive
measurements on the qubit travelling there and back between Alice and Bob, where Eve
employs quantum correlations in both quantum channels, which we name the two-mode
attack. In the current paper, we focus on the one-mode attack. Moreover, for the sake of
simplicity, we only consider the attack on the quantum channel that transmits the qubit
from Alice to Bob. We omit the attack on the quantum channel that sends the qubit from
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Bob to Alice. Because the current paper is the first step in investigating the security of
Bub’s protocol, we choose this attack strategy over another one.
Hence, in this section, we consider the case where Eve measures σξ on the channel
qubit sent by Alice and resends it to Bob. We assume that σξ represents an observable
of the spin along an arbitrary direction.
We start deriving an explicit form of the projection operators of σξ. We prepare Euler’s
rotation matrix for SU(2) as follows [17]:
U(α, β, γ) = exp
(
− i
2
ασz
)
exp
(
− i
2
βσy
)
exp
(
− i
2
γσz
)
=
(
e−i(α+γ)/2 cos(β/2) −e−i(α−γ)/2 sin(β/2)
ei(α−γ)/2 sin(β/2) ei(α+γ)/2 cos(β/2)
)
, (8)
where 0 ≤ α < 4pi, 0 ≤ β < 4pi, and 0 ≤ γ < 4pi. Using U(α, β, γ), we can write down
the projection operators of σξ as
Pˆ (σξ = 1) = U(α, β, γ)
(
1 0
0 0
)
U †(α, β, γ)
=
(
cos2(β/2) e−iα sin(β/2) cos(β/2)
eiα sin(β/2) cos(β/2) sin2(β/2)
)
, (9)
Pˆ (σξ = −1) = U(α, β, γ)
(
0 0
0 1
)
U †(α, β, γ)
=
(
sin2(β/2) −e−iα sin(β/2) cos(β/2)
−eiα sin(β/2) cos(β/2) cos2(β/2)
)
. (10)
For example, putting (α, β) = (0, 0), (0, pi/2), and (pi/2, pi/2), we obtain σξ = σz , σx, and
σy, respectively.
Here, we define the probability that is useful for the discussion in the rest of the current
paper. For example, we describe the probability that Bob has σx = i and Eve obtains
σξ = j on condition that Alice detects |r2〉 as
prob(σx = i, σξ = j, r2) =
|〈r2|Pˆ (σx = i)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2∑
k,l∈{1,−1} |〈r2|Pˆ (σx = k)Pˆ (σξ = l)|ψ〉|2
for i, j ∈ {1,−1}.
(11)
In the following paragraphs, we consider the strategy of the eavesdropper Eve. First,
Eve needs to let Alice and Bob not notice her illegal acts. To think in concrete terms, we
assume a case where Bob observes σx and Alice detects |r2〉. In this case, Eve had better
make
∑
j∈{1,−1} prob(σx = −1, σξ = j, r2) greater in value and let Alice and Bob not find
evidence of her eavesdropping. Similarly, if Bob observes σz and Alice detects |r2〉, Eve
has to make
∑
j∈{1,−1} prob(σz = 1, σξ = j, r2) greater in value. If Bob measures σx and
Alice perceives |r3〉, Eve had better let ∑j∈{1,−1} prob(σx = 1, σξ = j, r3) be larger. If Bob
measures σz and Alice perceives |r3〉, Eve should have ∑j∈{1,−1} prob(σz = −1, σξ = j, r3)
larger in value.
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Second, Eve has to guess right at the random bit of the secret key that Alice obtains.
To put the discussion more concretely, we consider a case where Bob observes σx and Alice
detects |r1〉. In this case, Eve had better make ∑i∈{1,−1} prob(σx = i, σξ = 1, r1) greater
in value. If Eve wants to guess right at the random secret bit that Bob obtains, she has to
let
∑
i∈{1,−1} prob(σx = i, σξ = i, r1) be larger. However, in the current paper, we do not
examine this strategy. If Bob measures σz and Alice detects |r1〉, Eve has to enlarge the
probability
∑
i∈{1,−1} prob(σz = i, σξ = 1, r1). If Bob observes σx and Alice perceives |r4〉,
Eve should have
∑
i∈{1,−1} prob(σx = i, σξ = −1, r4) larger. If Bob measures σz and Alice
finds |r4〉, Eve had better enlarge the probability ∑i∈{1,−1} prob(σz = i, σξ = −1, r4).
To evaluate the probabilities that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s malicious acts
in the subsequence S23, we prepare eight functions fk(α, β) and gk(α, β) for k = 1, 2, 3, 4
in Equations (67), (68), (69), and (70) in Appendix A. Then, the following relations hold
between the probabilities and the eight functions:
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = 1, σξ = j, r2) ∝ f1(α, β),
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = −1, σξ = j, r2) ∝ g1(α, β),
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = 1, σξ = j, r2) ∝ f2(α, β),
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = −1, σξ = j, r2) ∝ g2(α, β),
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = 1, σξ = j, r3) ∝ f3(α, β),
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = −1, σξ = j, r3) ∝ g3(α, β),
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = 1, σξ = j, r3) ∝ f4(α, β),
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = −1, σξ = j, r3) ∝ g4(α, β). (12)
Using these functions, we can evaluate the probability that Alice and Bob cannot
notice evidence of Eve’s illegal acts as follows. Alice and Bob do not become aware of
Eve’s interference if results of their measurements are consistent with the relations shown
in Table 1. The probability that Bob obtains σx = −1 in the case where Alice detects
|r2〉 is given by
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = −1, σξ = j, r2) = g1(α, β)
f1(α, β) + g1(α, β)
. (13)
The probability that Bob has σz = 1 in the case where Alice perceives |r2〉 is given by
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = 1, σξ = j, r2) =
f2(α, β)
f2(α, β) + g2(α, β)
. (14)
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The probability that Bob obtains σx = 1 on condition that Alice detects |r3〉 is given by
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = 1, σξ = j, r3) =
f3(α, β)
f3(α, β) + g3(α, β)
. (15)
The probability that Bob has σz = −1 on condition that Alice finds |r3〉 is given by
∑
j∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = −1, σξ = j, r3) = g4(α, β)
f4(α, β) + g4(α, β)
. (16)
To let Alice and Bob not find a sign of Eve’s eavesdropping, Eve has to make g1(α, β),
f2(α, β), f3(α, β), and g4(α, β) larger and f1(α, β), g2(α, β), g3(α, β), and f4(α, β) smaller
in value. However, only from this principle, it is difficult for us to obtain optimum α and
β for Eve’s attack.
Thus, to let the problem be simple, we make it a condition that the following relation
holds:
f1(α, β) = g2(α, β) = g3(α, β) = f4(α, β). (17)
In other words, Eve sets a plan in which the parameters α and β satisfy Equation (17).
In Section 4, we analyse this plan of Eve’s in detail.
Here, we evaluate the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit
Alice obtains in the subsequence S14. To perform this evaluation, we prepare eight func-
tions uk(α, β) and vk(α, β) for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 in Equations (71), (72), (73), and (74) in
Appendix A. Then, the following relations hold between the probabilities and the eight
functions: ∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = i, σξ = 1, r1) ∝ u1(α, β),
∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = i, σξ = −1, r1) ∝ v1(α, β),
∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = i, σξ = 1, r1) ∝ u2(α, β),
∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = i, σξ = −1, r1) ∝ v2(α, β),
∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = i, σξ = 1, r4) ∝ u3(α, β),
∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σx = i, σξ = −1, r4) ∝ v3(α, β),
∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = i, σξ = 1, r4) ∝ u4(α, β),
∑
i∈{1,−1}
prob(σz = i, σξ = −1, r4) ∝ v4(α, β). (18)
We can derive the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice
obtains as follows. If Bob observes σx and Alice detects |r1〉, it is given by
u1(α, β)
u1(α, β) + v1(α, β)
. (19)
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If Bob observes σz and Alice perceives |r1〉, it is given by
u2(α, β)
u2(α, β) + v2(α, β)
. (20)
If Bob measures σx and Alice detects |r4〉, it is given by
v3(α, β)
u3(α, β) + v3(α, β)
. (21)
If Bob measures σz and Alice finds |r4〉, it is given by
v4(α, β)
u4(α, β) + v4(α, β)
. (22)
We describe the probability that Alice detects |ri〉 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 as Qi. Then, we
obtain the following relation:
Q1 : Q2 : Q3 : Q4 = u1+v1+u2+v2 : f1+g1+f2+g2 : f3+g3+f4+g4 : u3+v3+u4+v4. (23)
4 Eve’s strategies where Equation (17) holds
In this section, we consider Eve’s strategies where Equation (17) holds. Then, we obtain
the following relation:
cos2 β − cos2 α sin2 β = 0. (24)
Hence, the parameter β is a function of the parameter α,
β = arctan
(
± 1
cosα
)
. (25)
4.1 The case where β = arctan(1/ cosα) holds
In this subsection, we consider the case where β = arctan(1/ cosα) holds. Substituting
β = arctan(1/ cosα) into Equations (67), (68), (69), (70), (71), (72), (73), and (74), we
obtain the following functions, where we use the notation f1(α) = f1(α, β)|β=arctan(1/ cosα):
f1(α) =
1
8[3 + cos(2α)]
,
g1(α) =
4 + cos(2α) + sin(2α)
8[3 + cos(2α)]
, (26)
f2(α) =
1
32
[7 + cos(2 arctan(secα))− 2(cosα + sinα) sin(2 arctan(secα))],
g2(α) =
1
8[3 + cos(2α)]
, (27)
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f3(α) =
4 + cos(2α)− sin(2α)
8[3 + cos(2α)]
,
g3(α) =
1
8[3 + cos(2α)]
, (28)
f4(α) =
1
8[3 + cos(2α)]
,
g4(α) =
4 + cos(2α) + sin(2α)
8[3 + cos(2α)]
, (29)
u1(α) =
1
16
(
2 +
3 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
+
1 + tanα
1 + sec2 α
)
,
v1(α) =
1
16
(
2− 3 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
+
1 + tanα
1 + sec2 α
)
, (30)
u2(α) =
1
8
cos2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
2 +
1 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
,
v2(α) = −1
8
sin2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
−2 + 1 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
, (31)
u3(α) =
1
16(1 + sec2 α)3/2
[−(−1 +
√
1 + sec2 α)(−3 + tanα)
+ sec2 α(−3 + 2
√
1 + sec2 α + tanα)],
v3(α) =
1
32
[
4 +
6√
1 + sec2 α
+ cosα sin(2 arctan(secα))
−2(1 +
√
1 + sec2 α) tanα
1 + sec2 α
]
, (32)
u4(α) =
1
8
sin2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
2 +
−1 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
,
v4(α) =
1
8
cos2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
2 +
1− tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
. (33)
Here, we pay attention to a relation,
[f1(α) + g1(α) + f2(α) + g2(α)]− [f3(α) + g3(α) + f4(α) + g4(α)] = 0. (34)
Thus, the ratio of the probability that Alice detects |r2〉 to the probability that she
perceives |r3〉 is given by one to one. Then, we obtain the probability that Alice and Bob
do not notice Eve’s illegal acts as
P1(α) =
1
4
[
g1(α)
f1(α) + g1(α)
+
f2(α)
f2(α) + g2(α)
+
f3(α)
f3(α) + g3(α)
+
g4(α)
f4(α) + g4(α)
]
. (35)
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Figure 2: Graphs of the probabilities that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s eavesdropping
as functions of the parameter α. The thick solid curve, thin solid curve, and thin dashed
curve represent the functions P1(α), g1(α)/[f1(α) + g1(α)] = g4(α)/[f4(α) + g4(α)], and
f2(α)/[f2(α) + g2(α)] = f3(α)/[f3(α) + g3(α)], respectively. The function P1(α) becomes
maximum at α = 0 and α = pi.
By contrast, we pay attention to a relation,
[u1(α) + v1(α) + u2(α) + v2(α)]− [u3(α) + v3(α) + u4(α) + v4(α)] = cosα sinα
3 + cos(2α)
. (36)
Thus, in general, the ratio of the probability that Alice detects |r1〉 to the probability that
she perceives |r4〉 is not always given by one to one. Hence, we obtain the probability
that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains as
P2(α) =
Q1(α)
2
[
u1(α)
u1(α) + v1(α)
+
u2(α)
u2(α) + v2(α)
]
+
Q2(α)
2
[
v3(α)
u3(α) + v3(α)
+
v4(α)
u4(α) + v4(α)
]
,
(37)
Q1(α) =
1
R(α)
[u1(α) + v1(α) + u2(α) + v2(α)], (38)
Q2(α) =
1
R(α)
[u3(α) + v3(α) + u4(α) + v4(α)], (39)
R(α) = u1(α) + v1(α) + u2(α) + v2(α) + u3(α) + v3(α) + u4(α) + v4(α). (40)
We show graphs of P1(α) and P2(α) in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. We put 0 ≤ α <
2pi because it is enough for the range of α. In Figure 2, the graphs show the probabilities
that Alice and Bob do not find a sign of Eve’s malicious acts against the parameter α.
The function P1(α) becomes maximum at α = 0 and α = pi. In Figure 3, the graphs show
the probabilities that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains against the
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Figure 3: Graphs of the probabilities that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Al-
ice obtains as functions of the parameter α. The thick solid curve, thin solid curve,
and thin dashed curve represent the functions P2(α), Q1(α)u1(α)/[u1(α) + v1(α)] =
Q1(α)u2(α)/[u2(α)+v2(α)], and Q2(α)v3(α)/[u3(α)+v3(α)] = Q2(α)v4(α)/[u4(α)+v4(α)],
respectively. The function P2(α) becomes maximum at α = 0 and α = pi.
parameter α. The function P2(α) becomes maximum at α = 0 and α = pi. Thus, Eve’s
optimum strategies are given by
(α, β) = (0, pi/4), (pi, 3pi/4), (0, 5pi/4), (pi, 7pi/4), (41)
where we use β = arctan(1/ cosα). In particular, (α, β) = (0, pi/4) represents the attack
with the Breidbart basis [4].
4.2 The case where (α, β) = (0, pi/4) holds: the Breidbart basis
In this subsection, we consider the case where (α, β) = (0, pi/4) holds. Because
f1(α, β) = g2(α, β) = g3(α, β) = f4(α, β) = 1/32, (42)
g1(α, β) = f2(α, β) = f3(α, β) = g4(α, β) = 5/32, (43)
using Equation (35), the probability that Alice and Bob cannot find Eve’s malicious acts
is equal to 5/6 = 0.833.... Moreover, because
u1(α, β) = u2(α, β) = v3(α, β) = v4(α, β) = (1/32)(5 + 3
√
2), (44)
v1(α, β) = v2(α, β) = u3(α, β) = u4(α, β) = (1/32)(5− 3
√
2), (45)
using Equations (37), (38), (39), and (40), the probability that Eve guesses right at a
random secret bit Alice obtains is given by
1
10
(5 + 3
√
2) = 0.924.... (46)
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Furthermore, ratios of the probabilities that Alice detects |ri〉 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are
Q1 : Q2 : Q3 : Q4 = 1 : 1 : 1 : 1. (47)
4.3 The case where β = arctan(−1/ cosα) holds
In this subsection, we consider the case where β = arctan(−1/ cosα) holds. Substituting
β = arctan(−1/ cosα) into Equations (71), (72), (73), and (74), we obtain the following
functions, where we use the notation, u˜1(α) = u1(α, β)|β=arctan(−1/ cosα):
u˜1(α) =
1
16
(
2− 1 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
+
−1 + tanα
1 + sec2 α
)
,
v˜1(α) =
1
16(1 + sec2 α)3/2
[(1 +
√
1 + sec2 α)(1 + tanα)
+ sec2 α(1 + 2
√
1 + sec2 α + tanα)], (48)
u˜2(α) =
1
8
cos2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
2− 1 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
,
v˜2(α) =
1
8
sin2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
2 +
1 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
, (49)
u˜3(α) =
1
16(1 + sec2 α)3/2
[sec2 α(1 + 2
√
1 + sec2 α− tanα)
−(1 +
√
1 + sec2 α)(−1 + tanα)],
v˜3(α) =
1
16(1 + sec2 α)3/2
[(1−
√
1 + sec2 α)(−1 + tanα)
+ sec2 α(−1 + 2
√
1 + sec2 α + tanα)], (50)
u˜4(α) =
1
8
sin2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
2 +
1− tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
,
v˜4(α) =
1
8
cos2
(
1
2
arctan(secα)
)(
2 +
−1 + tanα√
1 + sec2 α
)
. (51)
Here, we pay attention to a relation,
[u˜1(α) + v˜1(α) + u˜2(α) + v˜2(α)]− [u˜3(α) + v˜3(α) + u˜4(α) + v˜4(α)] = 0. (52)
Thus, the probability that Alice detects |r1〉 to the probability that she perceives |r4〉 is
one to one. Hence, the probability that Eve guesses right at a random secret bit Alice
obtains is given by
P˜2(α) =
1
4
[
u˜1(α)
u˜1(α) + v˜1(α)
+
u˜2(α)
u˜2(α) + v˜2(α)
+
v˜3(α)
u˜3(α) + v˜3(α)
+
v˜4(α)
u˜4(α) + v˜4(α)
]
=
1
2
. (53)
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This implies that Eve obtains a completely random bit, and therefore there is no correla-
tion between Eve and Alice’s bits. Hence, Eve cannot gain any information although she
eavesdrops on the transmission from Alice to Bob.
4.4 The case where (α, β) = (pi, pi/4) holds
In this subsection, we consider the case where the parameters are given by (α, β) =
(pi, pi/4). In this case, β = arctan(−1/ cosα) holds. Because
f1(α, β) = g2(α, β) = g3(α, β) = f4(α, β) = 1/32, (54)
g1(α, β) = f2(α, β) = f3(α, β) = g4(α, β) = 9/32, (55)
using Equation (35), the probability that Alice and Bob cannot notice Eve’s illegal acts
is given by 9/10. Moreover, because
u1(α, β) = v2(α, β) = v3(α, β) = u4(α, β) = (3−
√
2)/32, (56)
v1(α, β) = u2(α, β) = u3(α, β) = v4(α, β) = (3 +
√
2)/32, (57)
the probability that Eve guesses right at a random secret bit Alice obtains is given as
follows. If Bob observes σx and Alice detects |r1〉, it is equal to (3−
√
2)/6. If Bob observes
σz and Alice perceives |r1〉, it is equal to (3+
√
2)/6. If Bob measures σx and Alice detects
|r4〉, it is given by (3 −
√
2)/6. If Bob measures σz and Alice perceives |r4〉, it is given
by (3 +
√
2)/6. Thus, the average of the probability that Alice and Eve obtain the same
bit is equal to 1/2. Hence, Eve’s eavesdropping is useless for this strategy. Furthermore,
ratios of the probabilities that Alice detects |ri〉 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are
Q1 : Q2 : Q3 : Q4 = 3 : 5 : 5 : 3. (58)
5 The impossibility of the delayed measurement at-
tack on the protocol
One of the interesting characteristics Bub’s quantum key distribution protocol has is the
impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on it. Here, we give a short review of the
delayed measurement attack as follows. First, Eve keeps her own some auxiliary qubits
handy as a probe. Second, Eve applies a unitary transformation to her own auxiliary
qubits and the channel qubits Alice sends through the quantum channel to generate
entanglement between these qubits. Third, Eve leaves her auxiliary qubits untouched
and sends the channel qubits to Bob. Fourth, after listening to the public discussion
between Alice and Bob, Eve makes a measurement on her auxiliary qubits depending
on the public discussion. Because Eve can change a method of her measurement on her
own auxiliary system according to Alice and Bob’s public discussion, Eve can enlarge
information that she gains by eavesdropping.
We can show the impossibility of the delayed measurement attack on the protocol Bub
proposed from the following considerations. First, we think about the subsequence S23.
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In this case, Alice and Bob disclose their results of measurements through the classical
channel. However, their revealed results have nothing to do with the random secret
key they share. Alice and Bob can only notice Eve’s illegal acts from their results of
the measurements. Therefore, although Eve makes measurements on her own auxiliary
qubits after Alice and Bob’s public discussion, she cannot obtain any information about
the random secret key that Alice and Bob establish. Moreover, Eve’s delayed measurement
on her own auxiliary system does not affect the probability that Alice and Bob do not
notice Eve’s illegal acts.
Second, we think about the sequence S14. In this case, Alice and Bob do not have
public discussion about their measurements. Thus, Eve cannot pursue the delayed mea-
surement attack on the subsequence S14. Hence, we can conclude that Eve cannot mount
the delayed measurement attack on Bub’s protocol.
Generating entanglement between her auxiliary subsystem and the transmitted qubits,
Eve can adjust a ratio of the frequency of S14 to that of S23. However, when Alice and Bob
disclose their public discussion through the classical channel, it has been determined al-
ready whether the transmission belongs to S14 or S23. Hence, Eve cannot gain information
of the legitimate users’ random secret bit by the delayed measurement attack.
In this section, we have proved that Eve cannot make the delayed measurement attack
on Bub’s protocol. This implies that Eve cannot make use of the public advertisement
disclosed by Alice and Bob via the classical channel to improve her delayed measurement
on her auxiliary subsystem and gain more information about the shared secret key.
We emphasize the fact that the delayed measurement attack covers the collective
attack and the coherent attack [18, 19]. If Eve applies the unitary transformation to
a separable, uncorrelated probe and each transmitted qubit, we can regard what she
makes as the collective attack. If Eve attaches one probe that is made out of a large
dimensional Hilbert space to all transmitted qubits, it is called the coherent attack. Thus,
the impossibility of the delayed measurement attack means that Eve cannot choose the
optimum measurement on her probe depending on the public discussion Alice and Bob
disclose. Of course, even if Eve does not utilize Alice and Bob’s public discussion, she
can obtain some information about the shared key by observing her entangled subsystem.
For example, she can try the coherent attack on multiple qubits emitted by Alice without
making use of public announcements Alice and Bob disclose.
The impossibility of the delayed measurement attack is one of the unique properties
Bub’s protocol has.
6 Discussion
In the current paper, we obtain two facts about Bub’s quantum key distribution protocol.
The first one is the following. If Eve makes the intercept/resend attack on the transmis-
sions between Alice and Bob under the condition of Equation (17), Eve’s best strategy is
the measurement with the Breidbart basis. For this attack on the single transmission, the
probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s illegal acts is equal to 5/6 = 0.833...
and the probability that Eve guesses right at the secret bit Alice obtains is given by
(5 + 3
√
2)/10 = 0.924.... If Eve pursues the intercept/resend attack on n qubits Alice
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sends, the probability that Eve’s malicious acts are not revealed is given by (5/6)n. This
probability decreases exponentially as n becomes larger. Thus, Bub’s protocol is safe from
the intercept/resend attack.
If Eve makes the intercept/resend attack on the BB84, her best strategy is also the
measurement with the Breidbart basis [4]. For this attack on the single transmission,
the probability that Alice and Bob do not find signs of Eve’s illegal acts is equal to 3/4
and the probability that Eve guesses right at the random secret bit Alice obtains is given
by (1/4)(2 +
√
2) = 0.853.... Thus, we can conclude that the BB84 is safer than Bub’s
protocol concerning to the intercept/resend attack.
The second fact that the current paper shows is the following. Bub’s protocol is
perfectly secure against the delayed measurement attack. By contrast, if Eve makes the
delayed measurement attack on a single transmission of the BB84, the probability that the
legitimate users overlook Eve’s malicious acts and the probability that Eve guesses right
at the random secret bit Alice obtains are given by at least 3/4 and (1/2)[1 + (
√
3/2)] =
0.933..., respectively [13]. This implies that the delayed measurement attack is more
dangerous than the intercept/resend attack for the BB84. Thus, Eve’s impossibility of
the delayed measurement attack on Bub’s protocol is unique among other quantum key
distribution schemes.
In the current paper, we do not intend to tell which protocol is better, Bub’s one or
other quantum key distribution scheme, for example, the BB84. In the present paper, we
aim at clarifying characteristic properties of Bub’s protocol from a neutral viewpoint. In
References [20, 21, 22, 23], the BB84 was proven secure. In other words, it was rigorously
indicated that the BB84 is secure against an enemy who is able to perform any physical
operation permitted by quantum mechanics. Contrastingly, security of Bub’s protocol
has not been studied well yet. We have to admit that it is not full-grown theoretically
and experimentally.
One of the most serious faults Bub’s quantum key distribution protocol has is that
Alice has to perform measurements of two-qubit states for detection of {|ri〉 : i = 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Because {|ri〉 : i = 1, 2, 3, 4} have entanglement, Alice needs to prepare a quantum circuit,
which was examined in References [7, 24].
As mentioned above, experimental realization of Bub’s protocol owns some difficulties.
Because the protocol uses a two-way quantum channel, it is vulnerable to the channel
loss and a noise source, compared with the BB84 and the E91 that make use of a one-
way quantum channel. Moreover, in Bub’s protocol, Bob has to carry out the projective
measurement, so that he must not destroy the channel qubit. In contrast, for the BB84 and
the E91, Alice and Bob only need to perform an ordinary strong quantum measurement.
The investigation of the BB84 has a long tradition and its practical use has been
studied in many papers, for example, References [5, 25, 26, 27]. Noises of the experimental
setup lead to increase of the quantum bit error rate. However, in the current paper, we
do not evaluate the maximum quantum bit error rate that the legitimate users can accept
because we focus on an ideal case where the channel losses and noise sources are not
assumed, the photodetectors work perfectly, and so on. In the present paper, we do not
argue those experimental aspects and practical uses of Bub’s scheme. These problems
remain to be examined in the future.
However, Bub’s scheme has some own merits that cannot be found in other quantum
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cryptography protocols. For example, as examined in Section 5, Bub’s protocol invalidates
the delayed measurement attack. This is a very interesting property the other protocols
do not have. Moreover, Bub’s scheme is a natural application of the ABL-rule. Thus, we
can consider Bub’s one as a typical example of the strange nature of quantum mechanics.
These points give sound reasons why we study the quantum key distribution protocol
based on the pre- and post-selection effect.
A Some useful functions for Section 3
For the sake of convenience in Section 3, we calculate the following equations from |ψ〉,
|ri〉 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and Pˆ (σξ = ±1) defined in Equations (2), (3), (9), and (10). We pay
attention to the fact that Pˆ (σx = ±1), Pˆ (σz = ±1), and Pˆ (σξ = ±1) act on the channel
qubit.
〈r1|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2 + (1− i) cos β + 2 cosα sin β
+(1 + i) sinα sin β],
〈r1|Pˆ (σx = +1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2− (1− i) cos β − 2 cosα sin β
−(1 + i) sinα sin β],
〈r1|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[(1 + i) cos β + (1− i) sinα sin β],
〈r1|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = −(1/8)(1− i)[i cos β + sinα sin β), (59)
〈r1|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) cos(β/2)[cos(β/2) + (1/2)(1 + i)e−iα sin(β/2)],
〈r1|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) sin(β/2)[sin(β/2)− (1/2)(1 + i)e−iα cos(β/2)],
〈r1|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/4)(1− i)eiα sin(β/2) cos(β/2),
〈r1|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = −(1/4)(1− i)eiα sin(β/2) cos(β/2), (60)
〈r2|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)(1 + i)(cos β + i sinα sin β),
〈r2|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = −(1/8)(1 + i)(cos β + i sinα sin β),
〈r2|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2 + (1− i) cos β − 2 cosα sin β
−(1 + i) sinα sin β],
〈r2|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2− (1− i) cos β + 2 cosα sin β
+(1 + i) sinα sin β], (61)
〈r2|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) cos(β/2)[cos(β/2)− (1/2)(1 + i)e−iα sin(β/2)],
〈r2|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) sin(β/2)[sin(β/2) + (1/2)(1 + i)e−iα cos(β/2)],
〈r2|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = −(1/4)(1− i)eiα sin(β/2) cos(β/2),
〈r2|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/4)(1− i)eiα sin(β/2) cos(β/2), (62)
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〈r3|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2− (1− i) cos β + 2 cosα sin β
−(1 + i) sinα sin β],
〈r3|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2 + (1− i) cos β − 2 cosα sin β
+(1 + i) sinα sin β],
〈r3|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = −(1/8)(1− i)(i cos β + sinα sin β),
〈r3|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[(1 + i) cos β + (1− i) sinα sin β], (63)
〈r3|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/4)(1− i)e−iα sin(β/2) cos(β/2),
〈r3|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = −(1/4)(1− i)e−iα sin(β/2) cos(β/2),
〈r3|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) sin(β/2)[sin(β/2)
+(1/2)(1 + i)eiα cos(β/2)],
〈r3|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) cos(β/2)[cos(β/2)
−(1/2)(1 + i)eiα sin(β/2)], (64)
〈r4|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = −(1/8)(1 + i)(cos β + i sinα sin β),
〈r4|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)(1 + i)(cos β + i sinα sin β),
〈r4|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2− (1− i) cos β − 2 cosα sin β
+(1 + i) sinα sin β],
〈r4|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/8)[2 + (1− i) cos β + 2 cosα sin β
−(1 + i) sinα sin β], (65)
〈r4|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = −(1/4)(1− i)e−iα sin(β/2) cos(β/2),
〈r4|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/4)(1− i)e−iα sin(β/2) cos(β/2),
〈r4|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) sin(β/2)[sin(β/2)
−(1/2)(1 + i)eiα cos(β/2)],
〈r4|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉 = (1/2) cos(β/2)[cos(β/2)
+(1/2)(1 + i)eiα sin(β/2)]. (66)
To evaluate the probabilities given in Equation (12), we prepare the following eight
functions:
f1(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r2|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/16)(cos2 β + sin2 α sin2 β),
g1(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r2|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[4 + 2 cos2 β − 4 cosα cos β sin β
+(3 + cos(2α) + 2 sin(2α)) sin2 β], (67)
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f2(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r2|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[7 + cos(2β)− 2(cosα + sinα) sin(2β)],
g2(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r2|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/16) sin2 β, (68)
f3(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r3|Pˆ (σx = 1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[4 + 2 cos2 β − 4 cosα cos β sin β + (3 + cos(2α)− 2 sin(2α)) sin2 β],
g3(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r3|Pˆ (σx = −1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/16)(cos2 β + sin2 α sin2 β), (69)
f4(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r3|Pˆ (σz = 1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/16) sin2 β,
g4(α, β) =
∑
j∈{1,−1}
|〈r3|Pˆ (σz = −1)Pˆ (σξ = j)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[7 + cos(2β) + 2(− cosα+ sinα) sin(2β)], (70)
which are calculated using Equations (59), (60), (61), (62), (63), (64), (65), and (66).
To evaluate the probabilities given in Equation (18), we prepare the following eight
functions:
u1(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r1|Pˆ (σx = i)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[2 cosβ + 2(1 + cosα sin β)(2 + sinα sin β) + cosα sin(2β)],
v1(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r1|Pˆ (σx = i)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[−2 cos β + 2(1− cosα sin β)(2− sinα sin β) + cosα sin(2β)],(71)
u2(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r1|Pˆ (σz = i)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉|2
= (1/8) cos2(β/2)[2 + (cosα + sinα) sin β],
v2(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r1|Pˆ (σz = i)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉|2
= −(1/8) sin2(β/2)[−2 + (cosα + sinα) sin β], (72)
u3(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r4|Pˆ (σx = i)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[−2 cosβ − 2(−1 + cosα sin β)(2 + sinα sin β) + cosα sin(2β)],
v3(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r4|Pˆ (σx = i)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉|2
= (1/32)[2 cosβ − 2(1 + cosα sin β)(−2 + sinα sin β) + cosα sin(2β)], (73)
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u4(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r4|Pˆ (σz = i)Pˆ (σξ = 1)|ψ〉|2
= (1/8) sin2(β/2)[2 + (− cosα + sinα) sin β],
v4(α, β) =
∑
i∈{1,−1}
|〈r4|Pˆ (σz = i)Pˆ (σξ = −1)|ψ〉|2
= (1/8) cos2(β/2)[2 + (cosα− sinα) sinβ], (74)
which are calculated using Equations (59), (60), (61), (62), (63), (64), (65), and (66).
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